Information and endogenous delegation in a rent-seeking contest

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

Samenvatting

We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent-seeking contests. We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common value. The players only know that the prize is high or low, with given probabilities. Each player can hire a delegate to act on his behalf. After a delegate is hired, she privately observes the true value of the prize. We derive the conditions under which, respectively, no player, only one player, or both players delegate in equilibrium. (JEL D7)
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)1497-1510
TijdschriftEconomic Inquiry
Volume55
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
Vroegere onlinedatum2-mrt-2017
DOI's
StatusPublished - 2017

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