Is Locke’s Account of Personal Identity Really Subjectivist?

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The aim of this paper is to challenge the notion of subjectivism involved in Udo Thiel’s and in other reconstructions of Locke’s account of personal identity. Although subjectivism is often taken to be the hallmark of Locke’s position, it is not entirely clear how we should understand this characterization. Thus, I will first address some general worries about this label. In a second step, I will discuss possible ways of construing Locke’s account as subjectivist and show how they rely on objective and intersubjective features. I shall conclude with a plea to drop this label with regard to Locke altogether.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)526-535
Aantal pagina's10
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
StatusPublished - 2016

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