Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect

S Gangopadhyay*, M Ghatak, R Lensink

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

47 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)1005-1015
Aantal pagina's11
TijdschriftEconomic Journal
Volume115
Nummer van het tijdschrift506
StatusPublished - okt-2005

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