Justification by an infinity of conditional probabilities

David Atkinson*, Jeanne Peijnenburg

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

13 Citaten (Scopus)
248 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)183-193
Aantal pagina's11
TijdschriftNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
Volume50
Nummer van het tijdschrift2
DOI's
StatusPublished - 2009

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