Locke on Individuation and Identity

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Locke claims that spatiotemporal existence is the principle of individuation. This claim has been criticized on two grounds. In the seventeenth century, John Sergeant argued that Locke’s principle of individuation may be useful in daily life, but leaves unanswered the fundamental question of what individuates objects. In the twentieth century, Peter Strawson argued that even if spatiotemporal existence is the principle of individuation, it is a principle we will never be able to apply. I argue that the first criticism rests on a confusion about what a principle of individuation should do, and suggest that the second problem can at least be mitigated.
Originele taal-2English
TitelThe Lockean Mind
RedacteurenJessica Gordon-Roth, Shelley Weinberg
Plaats van productieNew York, NY
UitgeverijRoutledge
Hoofdstuk26
Pagina's237-243
Aantal pagina's7
ISBN van elektronische versie9781315099675
ISBN van geprinte versie9781138296909
DOI's
StatusPublished - 31-aug.-2021

Publicatie series

NaamRoutledge Philosophical Minds

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