Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

Jacob Dijkstra*, Marcus van Assen

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

9 Citaten (Scopus)
60 Downloads (Pure)


We propose a game theoretical model of one-shot network public goods formalizing the 'closure argument' that cooperation is more frequent in denser groups or networks. Equilibrium analyses show that (i) an 'inefficiency problem' exists: players all preferring mutual cooperation need not all cooperate; (ii) in dyads, groups and networks with degree independence, first order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of cooperation preferences or the degree distribution (weakly) increases cooperation, and (iii) the latter result does not hold for networks with degree dependence. Hence the closure argument always holds in networks satisfying degree independence but not in other networks. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)573-582
Aantal pagina's10
TijdschriftSocial Networks
Nummer van het tijdschrift4
StatusPublished - okt-2013

Citeer dit