No cure, be paid: Super-contingent fee contracts

L. Schoonbeek; P. Kooreman

doi:10.1080/13504850500142544

No cure, be paid: Super-contingent fee contracts

L. Schoonbeek, P. Kooreman

Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Onderzoeksoutput › Academic › peer review

1 Citaat (Scopus)

Samenvatting

A general principal-agent problem with two possible outputs, high or low is considered. The agent's utility function is additively separable in wealth and effort. It is shown that under the optimal contract, the agent should pay a penalty fee to the principal if the low output occurs.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	549-551
Aantal pagina's	3
Tijdschrift	Applied Economics Letters
Volume	12
Nummer van het tijdschrift	9
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850500142544
Status	Published - 15-jul.-2005

Toegang tot document

10.1080/13504850500142544

Handle.net

Permanente koppeling

Document onder embargo

No cure, be paid Super-contingent fee contracts
Final publisher's version, 80,5 KB
Kopie aanvragen

Citeer dit

@article{174743c6619f41588ea18f19ece24c7b,

title = "No cure, be paid: Super-contingent fee contracts",

abstract = "A general principal-agent problem with two possible outputs, high or low is considered. The agent's utility function is additively separable in wealth and effort. It is shown that under the optimal contract, the agent should pay a penalty fee to the principal if the low output occurs.",

author = "L. Schoonbeek and P. Kooreman",

year = "2005",

month = jul,

day = "15",

doi = "10.1080/13504850500142544",

language = "English",

volume = "12",

pages = "549--551",

journal = "Applied Economics Letters",

issn = "1350-4851",

publisher = "ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD",

number = "9",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - No cure, be paid

T2 - Super-contingent fee contracts

AU - Schoonbeek, L.

AU - Kooreman, P.

PY - 2005/7/15

Y1 - 2005/7/15

N2 - A general principal-agent problem with two possible outputs, high or low is considered. The agent's utility function is additively separable in wealth and effort. It is shown that under the optimal contract, the agent should pay a penalty fee to the principal if the low output occurs.

AB - A general principal-agent problem with two possible outputs, high or low is considered. The agent's utility function is additively separable in wealth and effort. It is shown that under the optimal contract, the agent should pay a penalty fee to the principal if the low output occurs.

U2 - 10.1080/13504850500142544

DO - 10.1080/13504850500142544

M3 - Article

SN - 1350-4851

VL - 12

SP - 549

EP - 551

JO - Applied Economics Letters

JF - Applied Economics Letters

IS - 9

ER -