On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games

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13 Citaten (Scopus)


In this paper we investigate robustness and dynamics for coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU games). In particular
we study sequences of TU games. These sequences model dynamic situations in which the values of coalitions of players are not
known beforehand, and are subject to changes over time. An allocation rule assigns a payoff to each player in each time period.
This payoff is bounded by external restrictions, for example due to contractual agreements. Our main questions are: (i) under
which conditions do the allocations converge to a core-element of the game, and (ii) when do the allocations converge to some
specific allocation, the so-called nominal allocation? The main contribution of this paper is a design method for allocation
rules that return solutions in the core or ε-core of the game under delayed information on the coalitions’ values, and therefore
the resulting allocation rule is called robust.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)2592-2596
Nummer van het tijdschrift10
StatusPublished - 2012
Extern gepubliceerdJa

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