Privacy in Public: A Democratic Defense

Titus Stahl*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

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Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally
public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In
this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of inten-
tionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this
context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen
Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere,
I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the
capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with
democratic self-determination.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)73-96
Aantal pagina's24
TijdschriftMoral Philosophy and Politics
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
Vroegere onlinedatum27-mrt-2020
StatusPublished - 2020

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