Reasoning about Evidence

Igor Douven

doi:10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.004

Reasoning about Evidence

Igor Douven

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Bayesians understand the notion of evidential support in terms of probability raising. Little is known about the logic of the evidential support relation, thus understood. We investigate a number of prima facie plausible candidate logical principles for the evidential support relation and show which of these principles the Bayesian evidential support relation does and which it does not obey. We also consider the question which of these principles hold for a stronger notion of evidential support.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	263-278
Aantal pagina's	16
Tijdschrift	Journal of Applied Logic
Volume	12
Nummer van het tijdschrift	3
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.004
Status	Published - sep.-2014

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10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.004Licentie: Elsevier

Reasoning about evidenceFinal publisher's version, 288 KBLicentie: Elsevier

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title = "Reasoning about Evidence",

abstract = "Bayesians understand the notion of evidential support in terms of probability raising. Little is known about the logic of the evidential support relation, thus understood. We investigate a number of prima facie plausible candidate logical principles for the evidential support relation and show which of these principles the Bayesian evidential support relation does and which it does not obey. We also consider the question which of these principles hold for a stronger notion of evidential support.",

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AB - Bayesians understand the notion of evidential support in terms of probability raising. Little is known about the logic of the evidential support relation, thus understood. We investigate a number of prima facie plausible candidate logical principles for the evidential support relation and show which of these principles the Bayesian evidential support relation does and which it does not obey. We also consider the question which of these principles hold for a stronger notion of evidential support.

KW - Evidence

KW - Probability

KW - Reasoning

KW - Bayesianism

U2 - 10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.004

M3 - Article

SN - 1570-8683

VL - 12

SP - 263

EP - 278

JO - Journal of Applied Logic

JF - Journal of Applied Logic

IS - 3

ER -

Reasoning about Evidence

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