Reasoning about self and others

Ben Meijering

Redeneren over zelf en anderen

Ben Meijering

Onderzoeksoutput

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Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift gaat over hoe mensen redeneren over andermans denken - hun kennis, gedachten en intenties. Het redeneren over andermans denken is noodzakelijk in sociale interacties, om het gedrag van anderen te begrijpen.
In tegenstelling tot andere studies, die impliceren dat ‘sociaal redeneren’ complex is en gelimiteerd door cognitieve capaciteiten, laten wij zien dat mensen beter kunnen worden in deze vaardigheid. Cognitieve limieten verdwijnen door simpele ingrepen, zoals stapsgewijs trainen, visuele ondersteuning en het stellen van vragen. Ons onderzoek laat tevens zien dat suboptimale uitkomsten in sociale interacties soms te wijten zijn aan het gebruik van verkeerde strategieën. Simpele ingrepen kunnen ook hier uitkomst zijn: door mensen te helpen betere strategieën te ontdekken en toepassen.
De belangrijkste bevinding van dit proefschrift is dat mensen sociale interacties daadwerkelijk interpreteren in termen van andermans denken, ook al is een niet-mentale interpretatie die formeel equivalent is, mogelijk. Zo wordt een rationale computer opponent niet hetzelfde behandeld als een equivalent mechaniek, ook al is de uitkomst in beide situaties hetzelfde. Bovendien is het spelen van een spel vanuit het perspectief van een ander moeilijker dan het spelen van datzelfde spel vanuit het eigen perspectief. Met andere woorden, sociaal redeneren gaat echt over andermans denken. Als zodanig, is het een unieke cognitieve vaardigheid.

Vertaalde titel van de bijdrage	Redeneren over zelf en anderen
Originele taal-2	English
Kwalificatie	Doctor of Philosophy
Toekennende instantie	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Begeleider(s)/adviseur	Verbrugge, Rineke, Supervisor Taatgen, Niels, Supervisor van Rijn, Hedderik, Co-supervisor
Datum van toekenning	6-jun-2014
Plaats van publicatie	[S.l.]
Uitgever	s.n.
Gedrukte ISBN's	978-90-367-7062-0
Elektronische ISBN's	978-90-367-7061-3
Status	Published - 2014

Toegang tot document

Title and contentsFinal publisher's version, 622 KB
Chapter 1Final publisher's version, 549 KB
Chapter 2Final publisher's version, 923 KB
Chapter 3Final publisher's version, 777 KB
Chapter 4Final publisher's version, 815 KB
Chapter 5Final publisher's version, 870 KB
Chapter 6Final publisher's version, 1,04 MB
Chapter 7Final publisher's version, 581 KB
Complete dissertationFinal publisher's version, 2,17 MB
PropositionsFinal publisher's version, 516 KB

Citeer dit

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title = "Reasoning about self and others",

abstract = "The topic of this dissertation is how people reason about the minds of others, their beliefs, desires, and intentions. Such reasoning is required in social interactions when we are trying to understand other people{\textquoteright}s behavior. Whereas previous research seems to imply that {\textquoteleft}social reasoning{\textquoteright} is complex and limited by cognitive resources, we show that it is susceptible to improvement. Our research shows that cognitive limitations can be alleviated by relatively simple measures, such as stepwise instruction, visual cues, and interactive prompts. Furthermore, additional findings seem to hint at the possibility that suboptimal performance might not be due to limited cognitive capacity, but due to suboptimal strategies instead. The previously mentioned measures might be beneficial here as well: Help people discover and apply better strategies when reasoning about the minds of others. The most important finding of this dissertation is that people do not interpret social interactions as formal or logical problems without considering mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. For example, a rational computer opponent in a game is still considered differently than an equivalent mechanical device, even if the outcome is the same in both situations. Moreover, playing a game from someone else{\textquoteright}s perspective is more complicated than playing the same game oneself. In other words, social reasoning really is about the minds of others. As such, it is a unique cognitive skill.",

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