Rejecting Supererogationism

Christian Tarsney*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

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Even if I think it very likely that some morally good act is supererogatory rather than obligatory, I may nonetheless be rationally required to perform that act. This claim follows from an apparently straightforward dominance argument, which parallels Jacob Ross's argument for 'rejecting' moral nihilism. These arguments face analogous pairs of objections that illustrate general challenges for dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty, but (I argue) these objections can be largely overcome. This has practical consequences for the ethics of philanthropy - in particular, it means that donors are often rationally required to maximize the positive impact of their donations.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)599-623
Aantal pagina's25
TijdschriftPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Nummer van het tijdschrift2
StatusPublished - jun-2019

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