Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value

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I argue that relativists about aesthetic and other evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. These objections concern the metaphysics required to make it work. Unlike (some) contextualists, relativists believe that evaluative propositions are not about the relation in which things stand to certain standards. Nevertheless, the truth of such propositions would depend on variable standards. I argue that relativism requires the existence of states of affairs very different from other things known to exist. Furthermore, there seems to be no convincing reason to postulate such entities. However, if they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. That is unattractive, as relativism was meant to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)75-87
Aantal pagina's13
TijdschriftBritish Journal of Aesthetics
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
Vroegere onlinedatum23-jun.-2020
StatusPublished - 2021

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