Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power

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4 Citaten (Scopus)
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We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the contest success function. We examine the cases where both players are either informed or uninformed about the size of the discriminatory power, as well as the case where only one player has private information about it. We show that in all three cases the contest has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In each case we characterize key properties of the equilibrium.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)103-114
Aantal pagina's12
TijdschriftEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Vroegere onlinedatum23-aug.-2018
StatusPublished - jan.-2019

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