Samenvatting
Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal‐agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost‐benefit calculation by gain‐seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal‐framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.
Originele taal-2 | English |
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Pagina's (van-tot) | 565-579 |
Aantal pagina's | 15 |
Tijdschrift | Public Administration Review |
Volume | 79 |
Nummer van het tijdschrift | 4 |
Vroegere onlinedatum | 27-jun.-2019 |
DOI's | |
Status | Published - aug.-2019 |