Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Corijn van Mazijk*

*Bijbehorende auteur voor dit werk

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

3 Citaten (Scopus)
6 Downloads (Pure)


This paper discusses Husserl's theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that - in contrast with intentionalism - intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism's exclusive concern with propositional content.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)499-517
Aantal pagina's19
TijdschriftCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Nummer van het tijdschrift4
Vroegere onlinedatum17-nov-2016
StatusPublished - 2017

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