Terrorism and cabinet duration

M. Gassebner, R. Jong-A-Pin, J.O. Mierau

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

28 Citaten (Scopus)


Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)1253-1270
Aantal pagina's18
TijdschriftInternational Economic Review
Nummer van het tijdschrift4
StatusPublished - nov-2011

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