The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value

MA Haan; Y Riyanto

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.02.003

The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value

MA Haan^*, Y Riyanto

^*Corresponding author voor dit werk

Onderzoeksoutput: Article › Academic › peer review

5 Citaten (Scopus)

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We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using [Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1-29] model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager's actions since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor and step in if a profit opportunity exists. In our model, a takeover threat decreases managerial effort and may increase the value of the shares. We also look at the extent of anti-takeover defenses favored by individual shareholders and institutional investors. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Originele taal-2	English
Pagina's (van-tot)	45-68
Aantal pagina's	24
Tijdschrift	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume	59
Nummer van het tijdschrift	1
DOI's	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.02.003
Status	Published - jan.-2006

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KW - shareholders

KW - firm

KW - takeover threats

KW - ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS

KW - OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

KW - STOCK OWNERSHIP

KW - WEALTH

KW - WELFARE

KW - PRICES

KW - POISON

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JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value

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