The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis

Anthony Robert Booth

OnderzoeksoutputAcademicpeer review

4 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

Stephen Hetherington has defended the tripartite analysis of knowledge (Hetherington in Philos Q 48:453–469, 1998; J Philos 96:565–587, 1999; J Philos Res 26:307–324, 2001a; Good knowledge, bad knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001b). His defence has recently come under attack (Madison in Australas J Philos 89(1):47–58, 2011; Turri in Synthese 183(3):247–259, 2012). I critically evaluate those attacks as well as Hetherington’s newest formulation of his defence (Hetherington in Philosophia 40(3):539–547, 2012b; How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge, Wiley, Oxford, 2011a; Ratio 24:176–191, 2011b; Syn- these 188:217–230, 2012a). I argue that his newest formulation is vulnerable to a modified version of Madison’s and Turri’s objection. However, I argue that Hetherington’s considerations lend support to a different, though also radical, thesis which can meet the objection. This thesis is what I call the Divorce thesis: the theory of epistemic justification is importantly independent of the theory of knowledge.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)625–638
TijdschriftErkenntnis
Volume79
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
DOI's
StatusPublished - 2014

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