The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015.
|Subtitel||How Non-Security-Related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance|
|Redacteuren||Oldrich Bures, Helena Carrapico|
|Uitgeverij||Springer International Publishing|
|ISBN van elektronische versie||9783319630106|
|ISBN van geprinte versie||9783319630090|
|Status||Published - 31-okt.-2017|