The subjective conditions of human morality: The relevance of Kant’s moral psychology

Marijana Vujosevic

The subjective conditions of human morality: The relevance of Kant’s moral psychology

Marijana Vujosevic

Onderzoeksoutput

1415 Downloads (Pure)

Samenvatting

Op basis van de standaardopvatting van Kants morele theorie vormt het merendeel van onze subjectieve, psychologische condities (zoals instincten, gevoelens en verlangens) een obstakel voor moraliteit en zijn slechts enkele van die condities hulpmiddelen. Maar zelfs die laatste zijn uiteindelijk louter instrumenten in de uitvoering van morele handelingen op grond van bepaalde maximes (onze eigen handelingsprincipes). Deze gangbare interpretatie lijkt dus geen ruimte te bieden voor een daadwerkelijk relevante morele psychologie. In dit proefschrift probeer ik in de eerste plaats aan te tonen dat Kants ethiek een waarlijk relevante morele psychologie bevat. In de kern is de relevantie ervan gelegen in het feit dat Kant bepaalde psychologische condities als noodzakelijk beschouwde voor zowel het naleven als het aannemen van morele maximes. Om uit te leggen waarom we deze subjectieve condities moeten ontwikkelen om morele maximes (die ons daadwerkelijk aanzetten tot juist handelen) aan te kunnen nemen, richt ik me eerst op Kants begrip van morele zelfbeheersing. Vervolgens behandel ik kracht en zwakte van ons vermogen tot zelfbeheersing. Uiteindelijk interpreteer ik Kants opvatting van het geweten en breid ik deze interpretatie uit met het ontwikkelen van een theoretisch raamwerk voor het bestuderen van de vraag of morele tekortkomingen die kenmerkend zijn voor psychopaten te herleiden zijn tot beperkingen in hun gewetensfuncties. Door te beargumenteren hoe vruchtbaar Kants theorie van het geweten is voor het verklaren van de morele incompetentie van psychopaten, laat ik zien dat Kants morele psychologie relevant is voor de hedendaagse morele psychologie.

Originele taal-2	English
Kwalificatie	Doctor of Philosophy
Toekennende instantie	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Begeleider(s)/adviseur	Kleingeld, Pauline, Supervisor
Datum van toekenning	22-jun.-2017
Plaats van publicatie	[Groningen]
Uitgever	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Gedrukte ISBN's	978-90-367-9850-1
Elektronische ISBN's	978-90-367-9849-5
Status	Published - 2017

Toegang tot document

Title and contentsFinal publisher's version, 201 KB
Chapter 1Final publisher's version, 197 KB
Chapter 2Final publisher's version, 522 KB
Chapter 3Final publisher's version, 563 KB
Chapter 4Final publisher's version, 700 KB
Chapter 5Final publisher's version, 921 KB
Chapter 6Final publisher's version, 1,01 MB
Concluding ConsiderationsFinal publisher's version, 222 KB
SummaryFinal publisher's version, 376 KB
SamenvattingFinal publisher's version, 440 KB
About the authorFinal publisher's version, 97,2 KB
ReferencesFinal publisher's version, 367 KB
Complete thesisFinal publisher's version, 1,01 MB
PropositionsFinal publisher's version, 410 KB

Handle.net

Permanente koppeling

Citeer dit

@phdthesis{9179a6867cb84808b3b2d717c05df606,

title = "The subjective conditions of human morality: The relevance of Kant{\textquoteright}s moral psychology",

abstract = "On the standard picture of Kant{\textquoteright}s moral theory and the place of psychology within it, most of our subjective, psychological conditions (such as our instincts, feelings and desires) are obstacles to morality, and only some are aids. However, even the latter are mere instruments in the performance of moral actions on the basis of our adopted maxims (our own principles of acting). This picture therefore seems to leave no room for a truly relevant moral psychology. In this dissertation, I primarily aim to show that Kant{\textquoteright}s moral theory contains a moral psychology, the relevance of which lies in the fact that Kant took certain psychological conditions to be necessary not only for observing moral maxims but also for adopting them in the first place. To explain why development of those conditions is needed if we are to adopt moral maxims of virtue on which we actually act, I first turn to Kant{\textquoteright}s notion of moral self-control. I then discuss the strength and weakness of our capacity for self-control. Finally, I interpret Kant{\textquoteright}s conception of conscience and expand on this interpretation while developing a theoretical framework for examining whether the moral flaws characteristic of individuals with psychopathy are traceable to their dysfunctional consciences. By demonstrating the fruitfulness of Kant{\textquoteright}s theory of conscience when it comes to explaining the moral incompetence of psychopaths, I show that Kant{\textquoteright}s moral psychology is relevant to contemporary moral psychology.",

author = "Marijana Vujosevic",

year = "2017",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-90-367-9850-1",

publisher = "Rijksuniversiteit Groningen",

school = "University of Groningen",

}

TY - BOOK

T1 - The subjective conditions of human morality

T2 - The relevance of Kant’s moral psychology

AU - Vujosevic, Marijana

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - On the standard picture of Kant’s moral theory and the place of psychology within it, most of our subjective, psychological conditions (such as our instincts, feelings and desires) are obstacles to morality, and only some are aids. However, even the latter are mere instruments in the performance of moral actions on the basis of our adopted maxims (our own principles of acting). This picture therefore seems to leave no room for a truly relevant moral psychology. In this dissertation, I primarily aim to show that Kant’s moral theory contains a moral psychology, the relevance of which lies in the fact that Kant took certain psychological conditions to be necessary not only for observing moral maxims but also for adopting them in the first place. To explain why development of those conditions is needed if we are to adopt moral maxims of virtue on which we actually act, I first turn to Kant’s notion of moral self-control. I then discuss the strength and weakness of our capacity for self-control. Finally, I interpret Kant’s conception of conscience and expand on this interpretation while developing a theoretical framework for examining whether the moral flaws characteristic of individuals with psychopathy are traceable to their dysfunctional consciences. By demonstrating the fruitfulness of Kant’s theory of conscience when it comes to explaining the moral incompetence of psychopaths, I show that Kant’s moral psychology is relevant to contemporary moral psychology.

AB - On the standard picture of Kant’s moral theory and the place of psychology within it, most of our subjective, psychological conditions (such as our instincts, feelings and desires) are obstacles to morality, and only some are aids. However, even the latter are mere instruments in the performance of moral actions on the basis of our adopted maxims (our own principles of acting). This picture therefore seems to leave no room for a truly relevant moral psychology. In this dissertation, I primarily aim to show that Kant’s moral theory contains a moral psychology, the relevance of which lies in the fact that Kant took certain psychological conditions to be necessary not only for observing moral maxims but also for adopting them in the first place. To explain why development of those conditions is needed if we are to adopt moral maxims of virtue on which we actually act, I first turn to Kant’s notion of moral self-control. I then discuss the strength and weakness of our capacity for self-control. Finally, I interpret Kant’s conception of conscience and expand on this interpretation while developing a theoretical framework for examining whether the moral flaws characteristic of individuals with psychopathy are traceable to their dysfunctional consciences. By demonstrating the fruitfulness of Kant’s theory of conscience when it comes to explaining the moral incompetence of psychopaths, I show that Kant’s moral psychology is relevant to contemporary moral psychology.

M3 - Thesis fully internal (DIV)

SN - 978-90-367-9850-1

PB - Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

CY - [Groningen]

ER -

The subjective conditions of human morality: The relevance of Kant’s moral psychology

Samenvatting

Toegang tot document

Handle.net

Vingerafdruk

Citeer dit