The probability argument in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (Section 1.4.1) has been widely criticized, with David Stove calling it “the worst [argument] ever conceived by a man of genius”. We explain that the argument is open to two interpretations: one that is in accordance with probability theory and one that is not. We surmise that Hume failed to distinguish between the two, and that this contributed to the confusion surrounding the argument.
|Titel||Reason to Dissent|
|Subtitel||Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation |
|Redacteuren||Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert van Laar, Bart Verheij|
|ISBN van geprinte versie||978-1-84890-333-3|
|Status||Published - 2020|
|Naam||Studies in Logic and Argumentation |