TY - JOUR
T1 - Threshold Models of Cascades in Large-Scale Networks
AU - Rossi, Wilbert Samuel
AU - Como, Giacomo
AU - Fagnani, Fabio
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - The spread of new beliefs, behaviors, conventions, norms, and technologies in social and economic networks are often driven by cascading mechanisms, and so are contagion dynamics in financial networks. Global behaviors generally emerge from the interplay between the structure of the interconnection topology and the local agents' interactions. We focus on the Threshold Model (TM) of cascades first introduced by Granovetter (1978). This can be interpreted as the best response dynamics in a network game whereby agents choose strategically between two actions. Each agent is equipped with an individual threshold representing the number of her neighbors who must have adopted a certain action for that to become the agent's best response. We analyze the TM dynamics on large-scale networks with heterogeneous agents. Through a local mean-field approach, we obtain a nonlinear, one-dimensional, recursive equation that approximates the evolution of the TM dynamics on most of the networks of a given size and distribution of degrees and thresholds. We prove that, on all but a fraction of networks with given degree and threshold statistics that is vanishing as the network size grows large, the actual fraction of adopters of a given action is arbitrarily close to the output of the aforementioned recursion. Numerical simulations on some real network testbeds show good adherence to the theoretical predictions.
AB - The spread of new beliefs, behaviors, conventions, norms, and technologies in social and economic networks are often driven by cascading mechanisms, and so are contagion dynamics in financial networks. Global behaviors generally emerge from the interplay between the structure of the interconnection topology and the local agents' interactions. We focus on the Threshold Model (TM) of cascades first introduced by Granovetter (1978). This can be interpreted as the best response dynamics in a network game whereby agents choose strategically between two actions. Each agent is equipped with an individual threshold representing the number of her neighbors who must have adopted a certain action for that to become the agent's best response. We analyze the TM dynamics on large-scale networks with heterogeneous agents. Through a local mean-field approach, we obtain a nonlinear, one-dimensional, recursive equation that approximates the evolution of the TM dynamics on most of the networks of a given size and distribution of degrees and thresholds. We prove that, on all but a fraction of networks with given degree and threshold statistics that is vanishing as the network size grows large, the actual fraction of adopters of a given action is arbitrarily close to the output of the aforementioned recursion. Numerical simulations on some real network testbeds show good adherence to the theoretical predictions.
KW - best response
KW - Cascades
KW - coordination game
KW - local mean-field
KW - random graphs
KW - social networks
KW - threshold model
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85035753146&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TNSE.2017.2777941
DO - 10.1109/TNSE.2017.2777941
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85035753146
SN - 2327-4697
VL - 6
SP - 158
EP - 172
JO - IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
JF - IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
IS - 2
M1 - 8120135
ER -