Was Adam Smith right? evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?

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This paper estimates the compensating differential in CEO pay for the increasing risk of dismissal using contracted severance pay eligibility of the CEO as the main instrument. US CEOs receive a 3 per cent premium in pay for each percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal. In pointing to the dismissal risk as a determinant of CEO pay, these findings contribute to the debate on the recent growth in CEO pay and the potential impacts of governance reforms.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)1-24
Aantal pagina's24
TijdschriftManchester School
Volume84
Nummer van het tijdschrift1
DOI's
StatusPublished - jan-2016
Extern gepubliceerdJa

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