In this paper, it is argued that boards internationalize by recruiting international directors in order to increase companies' performance. However, increasing nationality diversity on a board can be costly considering that it potentially creates cooperative problems on a board due to fault-lines and separation processes. As a result, boards will prefer international candidates who are more similar to themselves on a variety of 'distances'. Based on data collected regarding 5683 board members of 361 companies from 15 countries in 2005-2007, we discover that the greater the distance (cultural, institutional and geographical) between the candidates' and the companies' country-of-origin, the lower the fraction of board members of that nationality on boards. Subsequently, it is argued that historical ties between countries play a 'distance compressing' role and partially compensate for the effects of distance. A colonial tie between countries will make recruitment of these particular nationalities more likely than others. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
|Tijdschrift||International Business Review|
|Nummer van het tijdschrift||2|
|Status||Published - apr.-2014|